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Demographic Transition, Childless 
Families, and Economic Growth
Francis T. Lui
10.1    Introduction
Demographic transition is a well-  known phenomenon that has repeat-
edly taken place in many countries during the last few centuries. Although 
characterization of this phenomenon may vary among diﬀerent authors, its 
main features can conveniently be summarized as follows.1 Before a society 
moves from stagnancy to sustained economic growth, there is often a signiﬁ  -
cant improvement in the life expectancy of its population. In the early phase 
of the development process, population growth rate rises, not only because 
people live longer, but also because total fertility rate (TFR) may go up. In 
the more advanced stage of development, there is marked and continuous 
decline in fertility until it has hit a “minimum” level.2
Understanding the mechanics of demographic transition is important 
both from theoretical and policy perspectives. At the theoretical level, demo-
graphic transition is closely linked to the interaction between investments 
in quantity and quality of children, which is at the core of endogenous 
growth models. On policy grounds, changes in fertility rates can easily exert 
profound eﬀects on many socioeconomic issues, such as education, health 
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care, housing, immigration, retirement protection, business opportunities, 
saving behavior, and even international balance of payments. These eﬀects 
are more prominent in economies where fertility rates deviate signiﬁ  cantly 
from the population replacement ratio, which is roughly equal to 2.1. Table 
10.1 shows that in 2008, average TFR in the world is 2.58, which is well above 
the replacement ratio.3 The European Union, consisting of well-  developed 
economies, expectedly, has a low TFR of 1.5. The United States, with a 
TFR as high as 2.1, is more an exception rather than a rule. On the other 
hand, the low TFRs in many economies in the Asia- Paciﬁ  c Rim seem to indi-
cate that they have already reached some advanced stages of demographic 
transition, even though the per capita income levels in some are still much 
lower than those in the United States or Europe. Comparisons with the 
1965 ﬁ  gures readily show that these Asia- Paciﬁ  c economies have undergone 
major declines in TFR in recent decades. In view of the possibility that low 
and declining TFRs can upset prevailing social and economic equilibria, it 
is useful for us to investigate the causes behind the demographic transitions 
in this region.
The low TFRs in East Asian countries indicate that the women there, on 
average, bear very few children. However, they do not explicitly tell us how 
many women choose not to bear any children at all. The importance of this 
matter is often overlooked. Parents can invest in their children’s human capi-
Table 10.1  Total fertility rates in a sample of economies
      1965  2008 
Asia- Paciﬁ  c Rim
  Australia 3.0 1.76
  China 6.4 1.77
  Hong  Kong 4.5 0.98
  Japan 2.0 1.22
  South  Korea 4.9 1.29
  Taiwan 1.13
  Thailand 6.3 1.64
  Singapore 4.7 1.08
Developed economies
  European  Union 2.7a 1.5
  United  States 2.9 2.1
  World   5.1   2.58  
Sources: Data for 2008 are from Central Intelligence Agency (2008). Data for 1965 are from 
World Bank (1992).
aThe 1965 TFR ﬁ  gure of 2.7 is for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries.
3. The source for table 10.2 is CIA (2008). There are minor discrepancies between the data 
there and those from oﬃcial government statistics. Since the errors are minor, we ignore 
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tal only if they have children. If an adult chooses not to have any children; 
that is, the optimal quantity of children has a corner solution, the investment 
vehicle disappears. Endogenous growth models built upon such investment 
would lose much of their relevance. This problem would not be too impor-
tant if only a small percentage of families choose to remain childless. How-
ever, as the evidence in the next section shows, up to 30 percent of the women 
in Hong Kong—an economy having one of the lowest TFRs in the world—
will never have any children, and this percentage is rising rapidly! Similar 
situations also occur in many other economies. Thus, the issue of childless 
families is not a trivial issue that can be ignored by model-  builders.
The purpose of this chapter, which is part of a larger study on the demo-
graphic transition, is to identify the factors that have signiﬁ  cant eﬀects on 
fertility choices. The theoretical framework is a variant of the Ehrlich-  Lui 
(1991) model. The empirical evidence is mainly based on the data collected 
in a survey that I conducted.
In the next section, I shall present the evidence to support the argument 
that zero fertility is a matter that we must reckon with. Section 10.3 brieﬂ  y 
discusses a theoretical framework that can generate both the demographic 
transition and corner solution for fertility. Some testable hypotheses are 
stated. Section 10.4 outlines the approach for testing the hypotheses, and 
presents and discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks are in sec-
tion 10.5. Finally, some details of the survey are discussed in the appendix.
10.2      The Prevalence of Childless Families
In this section, I shall argue that the experiences of Hong Kong can serve 
as a “leading indicator” for the demographic transitions in East Asia and 
possibly other developed economies as well. I shall also provide estimates for 
the proportion of Hong Kong women who will remain childless throughout 
their lives.
There is now an extensive literature on the relationship between longev-
ity and fertility,4 some of them showing that an increase in longevity can 
initiate the onset of the demographic transition. Life expectancy at birth in 
Hong Kong in 2006 was 85.6 years for women and 79.5 for men.5 Not only 
are these among the highest in the world, they also indicate substantial in-
creases since 1981, when the corresponding ﬁ  gures were 78.5 and 72.3, re-
spectively. As such, it is not surprising to see that the median age of the 
Hong Kong population has risen from thirty-  four in 1996 to thirty-  nine in 
2006. More importantly, the total fertility rate in Hong Kong, as evidenced 
in table 10.2, has also experienced a long and rapid decline episode. Table 
4. Some examples, in chronological order, are Ehrlich and Lui (1991, 1997); Blackburn and 
Cipriani (2002); Boldrin and Jones (2002); Kalemli- Ozcan (2003); Doepke (2004, 2005); Zhang 
and Zhang (2005); and Soares (2006).
5. See table 1.4 of Census and Statistics Department (2007).354    Francis  T.  Lui
10.2 also shows that Hong Kong’s TFR has fallen below one only in recent 
years. Back in 1965, it was as high as 4.5.
The slight increase in TFR in the last few years should not be interpreted 
as a reversal in trend. From 1998 to 2003, Hong Kong suﬀered from a pro-
longed deﬂ  ationary recession. The fertility rate in that period, as recorded 
in the 2001 Census, was likely depressed to below trend level because of the 
unfavorable economic environment. Using arguments similar to Becker and 
Barro (1988), we expect that parents would try to make up for the “losses” 
of children when the economy improved again after 2003.
Given the low TFR in Hong Kong, we want to estimate the proportion 
of women who will have zero fertility in their entire lifetimes. The estimates 
are based on oﬃcial census data of various years. These data also allow us 
to make some simple projections of what will happen in the near future.
Census data can provide information on the number of children that have 
already been born, but there is no direct information on what would happen 
to women’s fertility decisions in the future. However, if a woman aged forty-
 ﬁ ve does not have any children, we can reasonably expect that the chance for 
her to bear children in the future is negligibly small. Figure 10.1 plots the 
percentages of women at each age group from twenty to forty- ﬁ  ve who have 
never borne any children for the years 1996, 2001, and 2006.
In 2006, the proportion of childless forty-  ﬁ  ve-  year-  old women is 29.22 
percent. While this is already a very large proportion, we should note from 
ﬁ  gure 10.1 that the childless rates of women in every age group have been 
increasing from 1996 to 2006. Table 10.3 provides further information on 
how these proportions change over time. For the forty- one to forty- ﬁ  ve age 
group, the percentage of women having no children rises from 20.9 percent 
in 1996 to 31.81 percent in 2006, representing roughly an 11 percentage 
point increase for the ten- year period. Judging from the high proportion of 
younger women who do not have any children, a proportion that has also 
been increasing over time, we can safely project that in the next decade, the 
percentage of Hong Kong women who will remain childless throughout 
their lives can easily exceed one- third or even 40 percent of the adult female 
population.
As a robustness test for the estimate that in 2006, 31.81 percent of the 
women in the forty-  one to forty-  ﬁ  ve years old age group do not have any 
children, we perform another estimate using a completely diﬀerent data set; 
namely, data from a survey that we have conducted. Details of that survey 
Table 10.2  Total fertility rate in Hong Kong
  1965  1970  1981  1991  1996  2001  2006 
  4.5   3.3   1.95   1.30   1.20   0.93   0.98  
Sources: The 1965 and 1970 ﬁ  gures are from World Bank (1992, 1993). The 1981 to 2006 ﬁ  g-
ures are derived from the age-  speciﬁ  c fertility rates reported in table 2.6 of Census and Statis-
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are discussed in the appendix. The survey provides information, among 
others, on the number of children that the respondents currently have, and 
the number of children they plan to have in the future. The estimate based 
on these details indicate that 27.5 percent of the women within the forty 
to forty-  four age group do not have and do not plan to have any children 
in the future. Since this additional estimate generates a result that is of the 
same order of magnitude as the earlier one, we can reasonably believe that 
indeed a very high percentage of the women in Hong Kong will never have 
any children.6
Fig. 10.1    Percentage of women who have no children
Table 10.3  Proportion of women at diﬀerent age groups who do not have any children
Age group
  Year   20–40 (%)   41–45 (%)  
1996 58.22 20.90
2001 63.83 25.31
  2006   69.75   31.81  
Sources: Figures for 2001 and 2006 are derived from the 5 percent samples of the 2001 and 2006 
Hong Kong Census microdata. Figures for 1996 are derived from the 1 percent sample of the 
1996 Hong Kong Census microdata. See Census and Statistics Department (1996, 2001, 2006).
6. Another robustness test is to look at the proportion of childless men in the population. 
By using a methodology similar to that which we have applied to women, we estimate that 
36.85 to 38.5 percent of the men in the forty-  one to forty-  ﬁ  ve age group in 2006 do not have 
children. This conﬁ  rms the notion that many families in Hong Kong will remain childless. The 
reason why there is a range for the estimate is that the census database only reports the number 356    Francis  T.  Lui
The prevalence of childless families is a common phenomenon that goes 
far beyond Hong Kong’s borders. Based on data from China’s 2005 1 percent 
population census, my preliminary estimate indicates that 25.7 percent of 
women in Chinese cities will remain childless when they reach the age of 
ﬁ  fty. This ratio is likely to be much higher in major cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai.7 From table 10.1 the TFRs for Japan and the four Asian 
dragons are close to one. Since many women in these economies have more 
than one child, but the average number of children per woman is around one, 
the proportion of those who are childless cannot be negligible.
Childlessness is prevalent not only in Asia, but also in the West. Even the 
United States, which has an exceptionally high TFR compared with other 
advanced economies, has a moderate, but nevertheless signiﬁ  cant, volun-
tarily childless rate of 7 percent in 2002 (Abma and Martinez 2006). In Ger-
many, 21 percent of the women of birth cohort 1960 do not have children. 
The childless rate for the birth cohort 1966 is estimated to be 29 percent. 
For university- educated women born in 1965, the rate is much higher at 38.5 
percent (Dorbritz 2008). In Italy, it has been estimated that about one-  ﬁ  fth 
of the women born in 1965 will remain childless (Mencarini and Tanturri 
2006). Among British women who have received university education, 25 
percent of those born in 1970 will likely remain childless (Kneale and Joshi 
2008). In fact, the European baby bust has attracted so much attention that 
the New York Times Magazine ﬁ nds it newsworthy to publish an investigative 
cover story with the sensational title of “No Babies” (Shorto 2008).
Thus, the emergence of childless families is not an isolated event, nor 
can this be regarded as quantitatively trivial. The analysis of Hong Kong’s 
experience is valuable because this can be regarded as a leading indicator for 
other economies whose TFRs have not yet reached the low levels of Hong 
Kong. In this chapter, I shall conﬁ  ne myself only to the causes of low or zero 
fertility rates, but not to their implications.
10.3    Theoretical  Framework
In this section, I shall brieﬂ  y outline a theoretical model that is able to 
generate the demographic transition. The model is adapted from Ehrlich and 
of children living in the household. It is well-  known that some Hong Kong men have married 
women in the Chinese mainland, and their children have not migrated to Hong Kong yet. Thus, 
in our estimation, we have to take into account the number of men who are married, but whose 
wives and children are not in the household in Hong Kong. Since husbands tend to be older 
than wives, it is no surprise that the proportion of childless men is larger than that of childless 
women in the same age group. The corresponding estimate for the proportion of childless men 
in 2001 is between 27.83 to 29.02 percent.
7. See tables 8.2a and 8.3a of China National Bureau of Statistics (2007). According to the 
2005 1 percent population Census in China, the TFRs of Beijing and Shanghai are 0.617 and 
0.643, respectively. Although some underreporting might have occurred because of the one-
  child policy in China, these extremely low TFRs imply that childless rates in these two cities 
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Lui (1991), modiﬁ  ed in such a way that it can accommodate zero fertility. It 
is presented here to provide a theoretical foundation for the main hypotheses 
to be tested in the next section.
Consider an overlapping-  generations economy where all the agents live 
for three periods: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, the person is a child and does 
not make any decisions. In period 1, the person is a young working adult 
who has to decide how many children she should bear, how much time she 
should invest in the human capital of each of her children, and how much 
she should save for retirement. She is obligated to support her parent if still 
alive. She also acts as a “companion” for her parent, in the sense that her 
being around would give psychological pleasure to the parent. Even though 
each person lives for at most three periods, the economy can last forever 
because some agents are born in each period. In period 2, the agent does 
not work anymore. She gets material support from her children and her 
own savings. In addition, she can derive utility both from the quantity and 
quality of her children.
Let the production function of human capital be8
(1)  Ht 1   A(Ht   H∗)ht,
where Ht   human capital of a representative working adult at time t; 
Ht 1   human capital of a representative working adult in the next genera-
tion at time t   1; H∗   raw labor (which implies that even if Ht   0, Ht 1 
can still be bigger than zero); ht   the proportion of time that a represen-
tative parent at time t invests in the human capital of each child; and A   
technology parameter in the production of human capital.
Consumption of a young adult at time t and the consumption when she 
is old at time t   1 are given by
(2)  c1(t)   (Ht   H∗)(1   vnt   htnt   st)    2wHt
(3)  c2(t   1)   [ 1nt wHt 1   B(Ht   H∗) st
m]    ( 1nt) H 
t 1.
Each young adult has 1 unit of time. If he or she uses the entire unit to 
produce the consumption good, output is Ht   H∗. Even when Ht   0, raw 
labor H∗ can make output bigger than 0. The number of children borne by 
a young parent at time t is nt. The proportion of time spent on raising a child 
is v. Thus, vnt is the proportion of time spent on the nt children. In addition, 
educating nt of them requires htnt units of time. Saving rate as a proportion 
of his or her maximum possible income is represented by st. The amount of 
consumption good provided by a representative young adult to support his 
parent at time t is given by wHt. The rate committed by the young adult to 
support his parent, w, is treated as exogenous here.9 The probability that a 
8. This setup is similar to that in Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990).
9. This assumption is made for convenience and tractability only. It is possible to model it as 
the endogenous outcome of an implicit contract.358    Francis  T.  Lui
young adult can survive to old age is  2. The larger is  2, the longer is the 
life expectancy of people. The reason why  2 is included in the term  2wHt is 
that a young adult does not have to pay for the old- age support of his parent 
if they have not survived. Hence,  2wHt can be interpreted as the expected 
support for the parent.
The expression for c2(t   1) in equation (3) can be interpreted as a compos-
ite consumption good consisting of the material part (the terms within the 
square brackets), and the psychological “companionship” function. When 
an adult has turned old, each of his children will provide support equal to 
wHt 1. Even though an adult has given birth to nt children, some of them 
cannot survive to adulthood. The probability that a child can survive to 
adulthood and has the chance to work is given by  1. The second term inside 
the square brackets is total returns from the agent’s savings, where B   0 and 
0   m   1. The last term in equation (3) is meant to capture the assumption 
that the quantity and human capital of his or her children can be treated as 
a utility-  generating consumption good. The parameter   can vary across 
diﬀerent people. A large   means that the person likes children very much.10 
We also impose the restrictions that 0       1.
The utility function of a young adult at time t is given by
(4)  ut   
(c1(t)1     1)
  
(1    )
     2 
(c2(t 1)1     1)
  
(1    )
,
where   represents the discount rate for future consumption. Since the 
chance for an adult to survive to old age is  2, we have to multiply old-  age 
utility by   2. We impose the restriction that 0       1.
A representative young adult maximizes equation (4) subject to equations 
(1), (2), (3), and nonnegativity constraints for the choice variables st, ht, and 



















    A 1 2w[1   N]
ht  
 ( v   ht)   Rn,
(8) where  N        w
−1Ht+1
 −1.
The left-  hand sides of equations (5) to (7) can be interpreted as the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between period 1 and period 2 consumptions. The 
notations Rs, Rh, and Rn represent the rates of return to savings, investment 
10. We assume that   is positive in the analysis. If a person dislikes children, we can actually 
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in human capital, and investment in quantity of children, respectively. There 
are some useful properties of this model that can help us to understand the 
process of economic development and demographic transition. Suppose 
that in the beginning, life expectancy is low; that is,  1 and  2 are relatively 
small. From equations (6) and (7), the rates of return to investment in quan-
tity and quality of children are low. The economy could be trapped in a 
zero-  growth stagnant equilibrium with no change in human capital over 
time. Now assume that  1 and  2 go up suﬃciently. Since both Rh and Rn 
increase as a result, parents tend to invest more in both quantity and qual-
ity of children. Consequently, both nt and Ht 1 rise. However, as the human 
capital stock for the next generation has gone up, its opportunity cost of 
having children increases as well.11 In that generation, the parent would 
reduce the quantity of children, but continue to invest in human capital. 
As the level of human capital of the parents in each subsequent generation 
rises, the economy continues to grow, but fertility rate declines. This is the 
demographic transition.
It should be noted that as Ht 1 increases during the process of economic 
development, the term N deﬁ  ned in equation (8) will converge to zero be-
cause 0       1. From equations (6) and (7), it can be shown that Rh   Rn 
if and only if N– 1   (1 –    )[(ht/  v) –    / (1  –    )]. Since the left-  hand side of 
this inequality goes up without bound, at some stage of economic develop-
ment, Rh must exceed Rn. This means that equality for equations (6) and (7) 
cannot hold simultaneously. There is an interior solution for ht, but nt has 
a corner solution, in the sense that it should attain the smallest admissible 
value.12
This immediately poses a problem. What is the lowest admissible value 
for nt? The ﬁ  rst candidate is that it is equal to one, and the second is zero. 
We should note that if the number of children is zero, it will be futile for the 
adult to invest in human capital of the children because they do not exist. 
Consumptions deﬁ  ned in equations (2) and (3) collapse to simpler terms. 
The person does not have to spend any resources in raising and educating 
children. During retirement, his or her consumption comes from savings 
only. There is no ﬁ  nancial support from the children and no utility from 
companionship. On the other hand, if the person chooses to have one child, 
he or she can continue to invest in the human capital of that child. Equa-
tions (5) and (6) are still the laws of motion determining the dynamics of the 
variables in the model. The decision of whether to choose zero or one can be 
made by directly computing the utility after substituting the relevant values 
of nt and other variables into equation (4). Assume that an agent has chosen 
11. Actually the opportunity time cost of investing in human capital also rises, but from 
equation (1), the higher human capital stock of the parent will make him or her more eﬀective 
in producing human capital. This mitigates the rise in time cost.
12. From equation (5), since a suﬃciently small saving rate can cause the rate of return to 
savings to go up to some large value, the saving rate always has an interior solution.360    Francis  T.  Lui
to have one child. We can demonstrate by simulation exercises that as the 
human capital of his or her descendants grows over time, the latter may ﬁ  nd 
it more advantageous to shift over to zero children. The timing of the shift 
depends on the parameters of the model. In particular, if companionship 
is viewed as important; that is,   is relatively big, it will be less likely for the 
family to arrive at either the corner solution of one or zero. After the shift 
to the new corner solution, this dynastic family will terminate.
The model discussed previously provides a coherent framework that 
generates a number of testable hypotheses. The most important of these 
is the Demographic Transition Hypothesis: In an economy that has entered 
a perpetual growth equilibrium, total fertility rate of the potential parent is 
negatively related to his or her human capital.
To test the demographic transition hypothesis, we have to introduce a 
number of control variables, some of which are interesting on their own. The 
model can guide us in identifying the proper controls. From equation (7), 
an increase in v will lower the return to the quantity of children. This leads 
us to the Opportunity Cost Hypothesis: When a parent ﬁ  nds it more costly to 
raise children, he or she will have fewer of them.
From equations (6) and (7), an increase in the educational technology 
parameter A will raise not only the return to investment in human capital, 
but also the return to the quantity of children. Hence, we have the Educa-
tional Technology Hypothesis: The more eﬀective a parent is in educating his 
or her children, the greater is the quantity of children she wants to raise.
Equation (7) includes an old- age support parameter w. It follows from the 
equation that when w goes up, the return to quantity of children will also 
rise. We can state the Old-  Age Security Hypothesis as follows: If a person’s 
old-  age security motive is stronger, he or she will raise more children.
Both equations (6) and (7) contain a parameter,  , which is a measure of 
people’s preference for children. This is another control variable that has 
to be included in our empirical analysis in the next section. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to explicitly model the factors aﬀecting taste, since 
there is already an extensive literature on this issue in diﬀerent branches 
of social science. For example, Koropeckyj-  Cox and Pendell (2007) ﬁ  nd 
that religiosity and attitudes about marriage and gender equality can aﬀect 
women’s acceptance of childlessness. Barber and Axinn (2004) reports that 
exposure to mass media inﬂ  uences can change people’s childbearing behav-
iors and preferences for smaller families. Schmidt (2008) provides evidence 
showing that attitudes toward risks can also aﬀect a woman’s fertility deci-
sion. Thus, the literature and the theoretical model of this chapter both 
indicate that we should incorporate preference variables as controls in our 
regressions. Another advantage of including preference variables is that we 
can quantitatively assess their relative importance in determining a woman’s 
fertility.Demographic Transition, Childless Families, and Economic Growth    3 6 1
10.4    Empirical  Results
This section presents and discusses the main empirical ﬁ  ndings. I shall ﬁ  rst 
explain the choice of the data set used and provide summary statistics of the 
data. Then empirical tests based on a Tobit model and a generalized Poisson 
model are presented and the economic interpretations discussed. I shall then 
use a Probit model to focus more sharply on the choice of whether or not to 
have children at all. For reasons to be explained later, despite the fact that 
the Probit estimator is less eﬃcient than the Tobit, the results generated by 
the former can still provide us with additional insights. Finally, a number 
of dummy variables have been used in all the regressions. The meanings of 
the estimated results on these dummies are discussed.
10.4.1      Choice of Data Set and Summary Statistics
To test the basic hypotheses outlined in the previous section and to gener-
ate additional results, the oﬃcial census (or by-  census) data conducted in 
Hong Kong once every ﬁ  ve years would be a good data source. The 5 percent 
sample contains microdata for more than 110,000 households and 340,000 
individuals. Although the large number of observations can give us greater 
ﬂ  exibility in the estimations, there are also important shortcomings. Since it 
only tells us how many children a parent has already had, but not the number 
of children he or she wants to raise in the future, we have to rely on more 
indirect methods of estimation such as survival analysis. Moreover, there 
are many possible determinants of fertility that are simply not included in 
the census database.13
In this chapter, I have chosen to estimate the results using a data set gen-
erated from a randomized survey I conducted. Details of the survey are 
provided in the appendix. In addition to having more speciﬁ  c information 
on fertility behaviors, the survey contains an important new variable, the 
number of additional children the respondent plans to have. We can add up 
the value of this variable with the number of children that the respondent 
has already had. This would generate the total number of desired total fertil-
ity rate, which is the main dependent variable to be explained in this chapter. 
Given this information, we can also easily construct a dichotomous variable 
(FERTDUMMY) on whether the respondent wants to have zero, or a posi-
tive number, of children.
Table 10.4 contains summary statistics of some key variables from the sur-
vey data set. It should be noted that we had set constraints on two variables; 
namely, approximately three- quarters of the respondents should be women 
and the targeted age group twenty to forty-  ﬁ  ve years old (child-  bearing 
13. It does not mean that empirical estimations using census data are of no value. A separate 
project with similar objectives using census data has been conducted by the author.362    Francis  T.  Lui
age).14 Other than these, the respondents were chosen randomly. Because of 
the constraints, the respondents were on average considerably younger than 
the median age of the Hong Kong population, thirty-  nine. Other summary 
statistics in table 10.4 appear to be consistent with the general proﬁ  les of 
these types of people in Hong Kong. For example, the number of years of 
schooling for these people is higher than the average person in the popu-
lation, which consists of many less educated older people. Similarly, the low 
number of years of working experience also reﬂ  ects the young age of the 
targeted group. It can also be seen that the majority of the respondents do 
not have children, and many of them do not want to have children in the 
future.
10.4.2    Veriﬁ  cation of the Demographic Transition
According to the model of demographic transition discussed in the pre-
vious section, total fertility rate, which is represented here by the variable 
TFR and deﬁ  ned as the actual number of children plus expected number 
of children in the future, should go down over time when parents become 
more and more educated. This longitudinal phenomenon can be captured 
here by cross- sectional data, if we assume that adults having diﬀerent levels 
of human capital at a given point in time are similar to those who belong 
to diﬀerent stages of economic development over time. Moreover, the pos-
Table 10.4  Summary statistics of the survey data
Number of respondents 1,017
Ratio of female to male respondents 794: 223
Number of never married respondents 622
Median age of respondents 28
Number of respondents who do not want anymore 
 children 409
Number of respondents who have no children 705
Median number of total desired children 2
Median number of years of schooling 14
Median years of working experience 5
Median years of experience for those currently 
 employed 7
Median monthly income of all respondents in HK$ 8,750
Median monthly income of employed respondents 
 in  HK$ 13,750
Number of homeowners 590
Median size of home in square feet 600
Number of respondents having domestic helpers 152
Number of siblings of respondents   Minimum 0, median 2, maximum 8
14. A small portion of the respondents fell outside of the targeted group because their actual 
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sibility of having corner solutions for fertility; that is, TFR equals to zero, 
means that the fertility data are censored at zero. A convenient approach 
to deal with this phenomenon is to use a Tobit model where the dependent 
variable, desired TFR, is censored at zero. The general formulation for Tobit 
is given by
(9)  yt∗   xi    εi
 y i   0  if yi∗   0,
 y i   yi∗  if yi∗   0,
where yi is the dependent variable, xi is a vector of the explanatory variables, 
 is the vector of coeﬃcients of the variables, and εi is an error term with 
standard normal distribution.
Table 10.5 presents the summary of several regressions aimed at identify-
ing the determinants of fertility in Hong Kong.15 The benchmark regression 
is the Tobit model in regression (1), where the standard errors are obtained 
by using the robust estimators of Huber (1967) and White (1980). The error 
term in this regression does not have to be identically distributed.16
Two measures of human capital, years of schooling (SCHOOLING) and 
years of working experience (EXPERIENCE), are used. I have also added 
the square of these two variables into the regression to capture possible non-
linearity in these variables. The estimated coeﬃcients for these four variables 
are all statistically signiﬁ  cant. Moreover, despite the positive signs of the coef-
ﬁ  cients for the squared variables, within the value ranges of SCHOOLING 
and EXPERIENCE, desired TFR is always negatively related to these mea-
sures of human capital. This result supports the Demographic Transition 
Hypothesis discussed in section 10.3. As the human capital of the potential 
parent increases, they tend to have fewer or even no children. We should note 
that the negative eﬀect of SCHOOLING on desired TFR is quantitatively 
much larger than that of EXPERIENCE. Other things equal, an adult who 
has fourteen years of schooling would have 1.24 fewer children compared 
to one who has no education at all.17
The positive eﬀect of marriage on desired TFR is consistent with the 
Opportunity Cost Hypothesis. Because of economy of scale, married people 
would be more eﬃcient in raising children. This is similar to the eﬀect of 
lowering v modeled in section 10.3. We expect that the desired TFRs of 
15. To mitigate possible endogeneity problems, I have also tried various instrumental variable 
estimators in the regressions. However, the Wald exogeneity tests applied to these regressions 
indicate that endogeneity is not a problem. In fact, the results reported in tables 10.5 and 10.6 
generally remain robust when instrumental variables are used.
16. If we do not use the robust estimator for the standard errors, as expected, the results are 
more signiﬁ  cant.
17. To compute marginal eﬀects in the censored regression model, we need the ratio of the 
uncensored observations to the total number of observations. In this case, it is equal to 0.841. 
See Greene (2003, 765).Table 10.5  Factors aﬀecting the demographic transition
   
(I) Tobit 
Dependent 
Variable   




Variable   
Desired TFR  
(III) Probit 
Dependent 




Variable   
Desired TFR
Constant 2.95582∗∗∗∗ 1.60520∗∗∗∗ 2.07478∗ 2.78667∗∗∗∗
(0.73271) (0.38530) (1.29690) (0.64604)
INCOME 0.0000043 0.000008∗∗∗∗ 0.0000072 0.000003
(0.0000047) (0.000002) (0.0000089) (0.000004)
MARRIED DUMMY 0.46078∗∗∗∗ 0.24701∗∗∗∗ 1.07197∗∗∗∗ 0.35063∗∗∗∗
(0.09089) (0.04714) (0.20328) (0.07555)
AGE –0.02126∗∗∗∗ –0.01470∗∗∗∗ –0.05604∗∗∗∗ –0.01432∗∗∗
(0.00757) (0.00397) (0.01573) (0.00652)
SCHOOLING –0.20422∗∗∗ –0.14388∗∗∗∗ 0.00997 –0.18473∗∗∗
(0.10287) (0.05214) (0.17742) (0.09141))
SCHOOLING^2 0.00709∗∗ 0.00462∗∗∗∗ –0.00014 0.00642∗∗
(0.00370) (0.00190) (0.00623) (0.00329)
EXPERIENCE –0.02758∗∗∗∗ –0.01235∗∗∗∗ –0.03329∗∗ –0.0239∗∗∗∗
(0.00752) (0.00400) (0.01866) (0.00647)
EXPERIENCE^2 0.000108∗∗∗∗ 0.000046∗∗∗ 0.00033 0.00009∗∗∗∗
(0.000038) (0.000021) (0.00038) (0.00003)
SIBLINGS 0.06384∗∗∗∗ 0.00730 0.13163∗∗∗∗ 0.05039∗∗∗∗
(0.01993) (0.01039) (0.04434) (0.01724)
TRAFFIC TIME –0.05215∗ –0.03168∗∗ –0.14216∗∗∗ –0.04056∗
(0.03723) (0.01849) (0.06857) (0.03197)
HOUSE SIZE 0.000216∗∗∗ 0.00017∗∗∗∗ –0.0000028 0.000199∗∗∗
(0.000103) (0.000048) (0.00021) (0.00009)
9 DUMMIES (Results 
  presented in table 10.6)
Number of observations 929 929 929 929
Wald  2 235.11 288.77 153.02
Prob    2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000




Pseudo R2 0.0852 0.2963
R2               0.2324
Notes: Terms inside brackets are standard errors estimated by the method of White (1980) and Huber 
(1967).
∗∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level for one-  tail test.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 2.5 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Demographic Transition, Childless Families, and Economic Growth    3 6 5
married people are higher. The negative eﬀect of age on desired TFR may 
be due to the nature of the dependent variable. Young adults may not fully 
realize the high cost of bearing, nurturing, and educating children and there-
fore may plan to have too many children. However, as they get older, they 
become more realistic about the cost.18 The time it takes to travel to work 
competes for resources that can be provided to the children. The negative 
eﬀect on TRAFFIC TIME again provides support to the Opportunity Cost 
Hypothesis.
The positive impact of the number of siblings of the parent may be due to 
economy of scale. Siblings themselves sometimes can help out in babysitting 
and their children can be convenient playmates of one’s own children. The 
result again supports the Opportunity Cost Hypothesis.19 This phenomenon 
may cause long-  term eﬀect for future generations. As the average size of 
the core family is decreasing due to the low TFR, future parents will have 
fewer siblings of their own. That will in turn weaken their intent to bear 
children.
It is well known that population density in Hong Kong is among the 
highest in the world, with the result that its residents have to live in rela-
tively small quarters. According to the results in table 10.5, the small size of 
Hong Kong’s residential quarters is likely one of the factors causing the low 
TFR there. This is consistent with the ﬁ  ndings in a recent paper by Murphy, 
Simon, and Tamura (2008), which provides evidence indicating that popu-
lation density, or price of space, is negatively correlated with fertility rate 
in the United States. Given the likely scenario that housing in Hong Kong 
will continue to be expensive, the marginal cost of raising children will re-
main high.
Assuming that children are normal goods, we should expect some positive 
eﬀect of income on fertility rate. However, the results of the Tobit regression 
in table 10.5 indicate the income eﬀect is quantitatively rather small and 
statistically insigniﬁ  cant.20 One may suspect that the apparent absence of 
signiﬁ  cant income eﬀect is due to problems inherent in the Tobit estimation, 
which presupposes that the error term is normally distributed. However, 
the dependent variable—desired total fertility rate—consists of discrete 
integers. An alternative approach is to rely on a count model. By doing so, 
we can also check the robustness of the other results obtained by the Tobit 
model.
18. Heaton, Jacobson, and Holland (1999) study how intended childlessness changes over 
time. Our ﬁ  nding that intended fertility declines as age goes up is consistent with this early study. 
If we use the actual number of children as the dependent variable, then the evidence indicates 
that this is positively related to age.
19. Parr (2005) also ﬁ  nds that the number of siblings of a parent is positively related to her 
own fertility rate.
20. Income data from the survey has been modiﬁ  ed to reduce possible biases in the estimation 
of income eﬀect. For married respondents whose reported personal income is zero (most of 
them being housewives), we use the income of spouse instead of the person’s own income.366    Francis  T.  Lui
A convenient count model that can be used is the Poisson model. How-
ever, this has the restrictive property that the expected number of children 
would be equal to the variance of the number of children. To mitigate this 
problem, we employ a generalized Poisson model, which is more ﬂ  exible. 
The probability mass function of this model is21
(10)  f(yi;  i,  )   
[ i( i    yi)yi 1e  i  yi]
   
yi!
for yi   0, 1, 2, . . . , and ln  i   xi . If the parameter     0, then equation 
(10) reduces exactly to the probability mass function of the usual Poisson 
model. It can be shown that
(11)  E[yi | xi]   
 i  
(1    )
,
(12)  Var [yi | xi]   
E[yi | xi]
 
(1    )2 .
Results of the generalized Poisson estimation are presented in regres-
sion (II) of table 10.5.22 It can readily be seen that the coeﬃcient for the 
income variable, though very small, is statistically signiﬁ  cant and positive, 
thus supporting the hypothesis that children are normal goods.23 All other 
results are similar to those in the Tobit estimation, with the exception that 
the coeﬃcient for the size of living quarters is not signiﬁ  cant. The core story 
for demographic transition remains clear and valid. Thus, the results in the 
benchmark regression (I) appear to be robust. In (IV) of table 10.5, we also 
report results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Again, we 
ﬁ  nd results similar to the Tobit estimation.
If we substitute the median values of all the relevant variables into regres-
sion (I), we can readily show that quantitatively, the most powerful factor 
causing the decline in desired TFR is SCHOOLING. But the median years 
of schooling of the Hong Kong population is considerably below those 
in highly developed economies. What are the other factors that contribute 
to the low or zero fertility in Hong Kong? In all the regressions in table 
10.5, I have added nine dummy variables, each representing the respondent’s 
subjective assessment of diﬀerent factors that may aﬀect fertility. These 
variables, acting as controls, considerably sharpen the estimations for the 
21. See Hardin and Hilbe (2007) and Wang and Famoye (1997).
22. Since the estimated   in regression (III) is negative, there is “underdispersion” in the 
data.
23. The marginal eﬀect of an increase in income on fertility rate in the generalized Poisson 
model can be estimated by making use of the incidence rate ratio. To induce a person having 
one child to have another one, his or her monthly income has to be increased by more than 
HK$85,000. In the survey conducted, there is a question asking the respondents to reveal how 
much government subsidy they would have to be paid in order that they were willing to bear one 
child more than what they wanted. The answer for most respondents was several million Hong 
Kong dollars. This seems to be consistent with the very small income eﬀect estimated here.Demographic Transition, Childless Families, and Economic Growth    3 6 7
objective variables included in table 10.5. The results for these dummies 
also provide additional opportunities for us to test the hypotheses discussed 
earlier. Discussion of these dummies will be postponed to subsection 10.4.3, 
which follows.
10.4.3    Childless  Families
The last subsection provides explanations for the occurrence of the demo-
graphic transition in Hong Kong. We now focus on the choice for zero fertil-
ity. The aforementioned Tobit and generalized Poisson models are appro-
priate tools for predicting fertility rates of diﬀerent values, including zero. 
However, one can argue that the factors determining the choice between 
zero and positive fertility could be diﬀerent from the decision on whether 
one should have even more children. The Tobit or generalized Poisson model 
does not recognize that the margin between zero and one could be diﬀerent 
from, say, the margin between three and four children. Hence, there is some 
value in using a binary model to explicitly deal with the choice between zero 
and positive fertility.
A convenient approach is to construct a binary variable, FERTDUMMY, 
whose value is deﬁ  ned to be equal to one for a person who plans to have at 
least one child, and zero if he or she chooses not to have any children. The 
probability of the occurrence of childless families can be estimated by a 
Probit model, which can be represented by the following:
(13)  Prob (Y   1|x)    (x ),
where Y is a dichotomous dependent variable that assumes the value of 
either 0 or 1,  (.) is the standard normal distribution function, x is a vec-
tor of explanatory variables, and  is the vector of the corresponding 
coeﬃcients. Estimation results of the Probit model are presented in regres-
sion (III) in table 10.5.
Before interpreting the results from the Probit estimation, we should note 
three things. First, the variables included in the two regressions are the same, 
which make comparisons between the two easier. Second, the error terms 
of both regressions are normally distributed. Third, by using a single value 
of one to represent diﬀerent quantities of children, the Probit method loses 
some information that is available to the Tobit estimator. This makes Probit 
a less eﬃcient estimator. Despite this, comparison of regressions (I) and (III) 
readily indicates that most of the results obtained in the Tobit model remain 
intact in Probit.24 The exceptions are SCHOOLING, SCHOOLING^2, 
and HOUSE SIZE, which do not have signiﬁ  cant results.
At this stage of economic development in Hong Kong, years of schooling 
seem to have stronger eﬀects on the number of children beyond one than on 
24. We have also tried a Logit model. The results are very similar to those in Probit and 
therefore not reported here.368    Francis  T.  Lui
the decision of whether to have children at all.25 The average size of living 
quarters in Hong Kong seems to be able to accommodate a small family with 
one child. The cost of space for the ﬁ  rst child may be low enough for it not 
to be an important concern. However, marginal cost of space for additional 
children may be much higher. That is why HOUSE SIZE is an important 
variable in the Tobit model, but much less so in Probit, which deals only with 
positive or zero fertility decisions.
10.4.4    Subjective  Assessment  Variables
In the regressions reported previously, I have included nine dummy 
variables as controls, but their results have been suppressed. This subsec-
tion discusses them. In the original survey, twenty questions related to the 
respondents’ subjective views of the determinants of fertility were asked, 
and the answers were recorded as dummy variables. These answers provide 
nontrivial information on what the respondents regarded as important in 
aﬀecting their own personal fertility decisions. The twenty dummies were 
all tried out, but ﬁ  nally I have included into the regressions only those that 
are statistically signiﬁ  cant. Although some respondents had claimed that the 
other eleven factors were important, the statistical evidence does not support 
the claim and so they are excluded.
Table 10.6 reports the results on the nine included dummies. Some respon-
dents believed that these were important factors and some did not. Among 
those who did, the statistical evidence shows that these factors would indeed 
make a diﬀerence in their decisions. Although I have only reported the esti-
mations for regressions (I) to (III), the results are similar in the OLS regres-
sion (IV).
Quantitatively, the factor that seems to have the most powerful eﬀect on 
fertility is whether the respondent liked children or not. This indicates that 
the preference parameter,  , which we discussed in section 10.3, is indeed a 
useful control. However, we should note that only 4.5 percent of the respon-
dents claimed that they did not like children. This percentage is not big 
enough to explain the very low fertility rate in Hong Kong.
Estimations for other variables in table 10.6 can shed more light on fertil-
ity decisions. Variable (a)—negative impact on job and career—can be inter-
preted as part of the opportunity cost of having children. About one-  third 
of the respondents regard this as an important factor. The negative sign of 
the parameter estimated again supports the Opportunity Cost Hypothesis.
Variables (b), (c), and (e) are related to the respondents’ subjective evalu-
ations of how eﬃcient or conﬁ  dent they would be in meeting the obliga-
tions of raising and educating children. Apparently, a sizable proportion 
of people did not feel that they were prepared. These results support both 
25. The theoretical explanation behind this phenomenon is being explored in another paper 
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the Opportunity Cost Hypothesis and Educational Technology Hypothesis. 
Variable (g) indicates that some respondents’ decisions were dependent on 
the views of others. It is interesting to note that in the spring of 2005, the 
Chief Secretary of the Hong Kong government at that time, Donald Tsang, 
made a casual, but widely reported, public remark that women in Hong 
Kong should bear three children because too low a fertility rate could have 
negative social consequences.26 In a city where information dissemination by 
the media is rapid, many people would have remembered this well-  known 
remark, and some (16 percent in our sample) would believe that giving birth 
to children was part of their social responsibility. Finally, Tobit and Poisson 
estimations for variables (h) and (i) indicate that for those people who have 
26. Mr. Tsang told the author of this chapter, in an informal occasion subsequent to his 
remark, that the remark was indeed casual and that the government of Hong Kong would not 
adopt any policy to encourage higher fertility.
Table 10.6  Results for the dummy variables on subjective assessment








dummy   1
Factors that negatively aﬀect my fertility decision: Yes   1; No   0
(a)   Negative impact on my job  –0.18370∗∗∗∗ –0.06121∗∗ –0.28677∗∗∗ 32.6
   and career (0.06793) (0.03527) (0.12576)
(b)   No conﬁ  dence in  –0.14572∗∗∗ –0.06128∗∗ –0.22817∗∗ 27.0
   educational system (0.06863) (0.03545) (0.12287)
(c)   Don’t know how to raise  –0.26491∗∗∗∗ –0.17184∗∗∗∗ –0.41467∗∗∗∗ 21.1
   children (0.08241) (0.04219) (0.13671)
(d) Don’t like children –1.07425∗∗∗∗ –0.46225∗∗∗∗ –0.97074∗∗∗∗ 4.5
(0.23034) (0.08297) (0.24338)
(e) No conﬁ  dence in marriage –0.24085∗∗ –0.12819∗∗∗ –0.41780∗∗∗ 9.5
(0.1256) (0.06291) (0.18717)
Factors that positively aﬀect my fertility decision: Yes   1; No   0
(f) Like children 0.46071∗∗∗∗ 0.12010∗∗∗∗ 0.77030∗∗∗∗ 69.9
(0.07692) (0.04214) (0.12632)
(g)   Having children is part of  0.23870∗∗∗∗ 0.11025∗∗∗∗ 0.34071∗∗ 16.0
   my social responsibility (0.08258) (0.04018) (0.18914)
(h)   Raise children to secure  0.14859∗ 0.19844∗∗∗∗ 0.15119 14.6
   old-  age support (0.09992) (0.04588) (0.18264)
If you don’t have children, what will you do to protect your retirement?
(i)   Don’t know what to do   1;  0.32013∗∗∗ 0.13867∗∗ 0.15278 6.0
   otherwise    0.   (0.15618)   (0.07107)   (0.30129)    
∗∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level for one-  tail test.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 2.5 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.370    Francis  T.  Lui
strong old-  age security motives, it is more likely for them to increase the 
quantity of children. This supports the Old-  Age Security Hypothesis.
Although the primary purpose of including these dummies as control 
variables is to sharpen the estimations for other variables, we have also ob-
tained more evidence to support the hypotheses discussed in section 10.3.
10.5    Concluding  Remarks
In this chapter, I have used Hong Kong’s experience to demonstrate that 
economies undergoing rapid demographic transition may end up having 
large percentages of women who choose not to bear any children. The seri-
ous implications of this possible outcome should be studied carefully.
I have shown that an extension of the Ehrlich- Lui (1991) model can natu-
rally generate not only the demographic transition, but also zero fertility 
rates for some families. Based on this model, I have proposed several testable 
hypotheses related to the determinants of demographic transition. These 
hypotheses are tested by a Tobit model, a generalized Poisson model, and 
a Probit model, using data from a survey that I conducted. The empirical 
results make a lot of sense. The quantity- quality of children trade- oﬀ, which 
drives the demographic transition, clearly exists. Other variables, such as 
diﬀerent measures of the cost of educating and raising children, number of 
siblings of the parents, preferences for children, sizes of residential quarters, 
and social responsibilities also play signiﬁ  cant roles in determining total 
fertility rate.
A number of puzzles remain unexplained in this chapter. For example, the 
speed of the emergence of childless families in Hong Kong, and possibly in 
some Chinese cities and several other East Asian economies as well, seems to 
defy any form of culture- based explanations. Confucian values, which heav-
ily inﬂ  uence East Asian countries, attach the highest importance to making 
dynastic families sustainable. Why is it that we ﬁ  nd some of the world’s low-
est fertility rates in these economies? The ﬁ  ndings in this chapter also suggest 
that heterogeneous preferences for children may be an important variable 
that should be explicitly modeled in future research.
Appendix
In this appendix, I shall present details of the survey, upon which the empiri-
cal results of this chapter are based.
The survey was conducted over a three-  month period spanning from 
November 2007 to February 2008. Each respondent was requested to answer 
forty questions, but some of these could be broken down into several sub-Demographic Transition, Childless Families, and Economic Growth    3 7 1
  questions. Some questions were similar to those asked in the Census con-
ducted once every ﬁ  ve years by the Hong Kong government, but there were 
also new questions introduced. Most of the questions were related to the 
socioeconomic and educational backgrounds of the respondents and their 
spouses. There were also speciﬁ  c categorical questions on the factors that 
the respondents deemed important in aﬀecting their fertility decisions. A key 
question, not available in the Census, was the additional number of children 
the respondent would like to have. Before formally conducting the survey, 
the questions were tested on a small sample of respondents to identify poten-
tial problems and to make improvements. This chapter has not fully made 
use of the answers to all the questions.
The respondents were chosen randomly according to the following proce-
dure. The research teams were sent to each of the eighteen oﬃcial districts 
in Hong Kong. The number of respondents chosen in each district was 
proportional to the population distribution in that district. The research 
teams were instructed to focus on people who appeared to fall within the 
age range of twenty to forty- ﬁ  ve. The research teams regularly reviewed the 
age distribution of the respondents to make sure that they were compatible 
with that of the general population in Hong Kong. We also decided that 
about three-  quarters of the respondents should be women. The survey was 
conducted at diﬀerent hours of the day and diﬀerent days of the week in 
public areas of these eighteen districts. To enhance randomness, the research 
teams chose the nth person on sight in the area after ﬁ  nishing with a respon-
dent. A cash coupon equivalent to HK$50 was given to every correspondent 
who completed the questionnaires. The sample size of the survey is 1,017 
observations.
After all the answers had been coded, the distributions of many socioeco-
nomic variables were compared to those from the census data. We have not 
spotted major discrepancies.
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Comment  Hongbin Li
In this interesting chapter, the author examines demographic transition and 
growth both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, it adapts a Journal of Political Economy (JPE) paper by 
the author and a colleague (Ehrlich and Lui 1991) in a way that allows zero 
fertility. Its ﬁ  ndings can be summarized in the following hypotheses:
•   Demographic transition hypothesis: Total fertility rate of a potential 
parent is negatively related to his or her human capital.
•   Opportunity cost hypothesis: When a parent ﬁ  nds it costly to raise chil-
dren, he or she will have fewer of them.
•    Educational technology hypothesis: The parent’s fertility rate is posi-
tively related to how eﬃcient he or she is educating his or her children.
•   Old-  age security hypothesis: If a person’s old-  age security motive is 
stronger, he or she will raise more children.
Drawing on census and survey data from Hong Kong, the chapter ﬁ  nds 
empirical evidence that support these hypotheses.
The chapter has many nice contributions. First, it has examined a very 
important issue in economic development. The theory and empirical evi-
dence can potentially shed light on our understanding of how demographic 
transition happens and where it will end up for developing countries. Second, 
low fertility has become a very serious policy issue in Hong Kong. In fact, 
many people do not even get married, not to speak of having children.
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Tsinghua University.